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Making the Law More Transparent
Text Linguistics for Legislative Drafting
By Stefan Höfler, Zurich
Abstract
An increasingly globalised and digitalised legal environment creates additional pressure for
legislative texts to be drafted in a clear and transparent way. In this chapter, I argue that text
linguistics can make a valuable contribution to how this goal can be achieved. To substantiate
this argument, I provide specific examples from legislative drafting in Switzerland. I show how
the concepts and methods of text linguistics can help drafters identify and remedy impediments
to the transparency of statutes and regulations at a functional, thematic and propositional level of
textual structure. I conclude the chapter with a summary of the challenges that lie ahead and the
solutions I believe we need to devise to maintain the transparency of the law in a globalised
world.
Keywords: legislative drafting, plain language, text linguistics, transparency
I. Introduction
Calls for the law to be more transparent are certainly not new, but they are still as
relevant today as before. If anything, they have recently gained traction due to an in-
creasingly digitalised and globalisedworld. There are at least two aspects to the prob-
lem: a substantive one and a formal one. From a substantive point of view, transpar-
encymeans that the law should provide measures that allow for effective public over-
sight of all but the most confidential state activities. From a formal perspective, it
implies that statutes and ordinances should be drafted in such a way that readers
can easily recognise the legal rules established in these texts and how they may be
affected by these rules. The formal aspect of transparency thus concerns the question
whether, and to what extent, the content of legislative texts is reflected in their lin-
guistic form, i. e. it concerns the strive for clarity. In the present chapter, I will focus
on this second, formal aspect of transparency.
Calls for legislative texts to be drafted in a clear and transparent manner have been
motivated, by and large, by a desire to improve the democratic legitimacy and public
acceptance of the law, to ensure legal certainty and equality before the law, and/or to
maximise the efficacy of the law and minimise the costs associated with administer-
ing it; these motivations have arguably been further accentuated in an increasingly
digitalised and globalised world. For one thing, legislative texts have become more
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readily available to ordinary citizens due to electronic publication. Nowadays it only
takes a couple of clicks or a simple online search to gain access to statutes and reg-
ulations. This development is likely to cause a shift in the composition of the de-facto
audience of legislative texts. Assessing the situation of legislative drafting in the
Commonwealth, Xanthaki (2015: i) concludes that “with enhanced accessibility
via electronic publication of legislation in many Commonwealth jurisdictions,
drafters ‘speak’ not only to lawyers and judges, but also to untrained users.” Indeed,
a recent study has shown that a majority of those who access United Kingdom legis-
lation via its official website are either laypeople or non-legal professionals (Bertlin
2014). For another thing, globalisation has resulted in an internationalisation of the
law. Nowadays, the context in which a legislative text needs to be interpreted often
transcends the legal system of the nation state. As a result, legislative drafters fre-
quently face the challenge of having to coordinate the texts they are about to compose
with legislative texts that use different legal concepts, different legal terminology,
different drafting techniques and that are possibly alsowritten in a different language.
In addition, national legal systems are under increased pressure to incorporate legal
rules developed in a supranational context. Arguably, both of these endeavours, co-
ordination and incorporation, are more likely to succeed if the texts involved make it
as transparent as possible what legal rules they establish.
In the present chapter, I will ask whether linguistics, and text linguistics in partic-
ular, can contribute to making legislative texts more transparent. To this aim, I will
first discuss how the issue of transparency has traditionally been approached in the
theory and practice of legislative drafting. In the main part of the chapter, I will then
demonstrate how the concepts and methods of text linguistics can be employed to
improve the transparency of legislative texts. Finally, I will ask what changes we
need to see andwhat efforts are required to tackle the challenges that legislative draft-
ing faces in an increasingly digitalised and globalised world.
II. Transparent drafting:
Theory and practice
In the past, there has been considerable controversy over the question of whether
legislative texts can and should be drafted in a clear and transparent language at all. In
what follows, I briefly summarise the respective debate in German-speaking legal
linguistics (see e.g. Lerch 2004; Eichhoff-Cyrus / Antos 2008); other jurisdictions
have had similar discussions (see e.g. Wagner / Cacciaguidi 2008, Xanthaki 2014:
125–131). Among those participating in the debate, three major views can be iden-
tified. Following Nussbaumer (2004), I will refer to them as the idealistic, the sceptic
and the pragmatic view, respectively. At one end of the spectrum, idealists call for
laws that can be understood by everyone. According to this view, legislative texts
can only obtain democratic legitimacy and guarantee legal certainty if those who
are subject to the law can understand them, and if they can all understand them in
the sameway (cf. Klein 2004;Wesel 2004). At the other end of the spectrum, sceptics
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question the very idea that legislative texts can and should be mademore transparent.
They point out that readers without legal training will never be able to grasp the legal
consequences associated with the provisions stated in legislative texts. According to
this view, therefore, it does not make sense to strive for transparency in legislative
drafting, as this goal could not be achieved anyway (cf. Lerch 2008). On the contrary,
trying to improve the transparency of legislative texts would then only mislead non-
expert readers as it would suggest that they can understand what ultimately remains
unintelligible to them (Ogorek 2004: 299 f.).
The idealist and the sceptic position are contrasted with a third, more pragmatic
approach. This third view is based on the every-day observation that while there is, of
course, no such thing as absolute transparency and texts will never be equally intel-
ligible to everyone, a text can still present its content in a graduallymore or less trans-
parent manner (cf. Lötscher 2016). Experience furthermore shows that it is not only
laypeople but also (and inmanyways even primarily) legal experts who strugglewith
and complain about legislative texts that are difficult to understand because they have
not been drafted in a sufficiently clear and transparent manner (cf. Griffel 2014). A
lack of transparency in legislative texts often has practical consequences for the effi-
cacy of the legal system as a whole: such texts result in legal decisions being less
predictable, they give rise to more legal disputes and they generate unnecessary
costs as it takes more time and effort to interpret them, which in turn means that
the law will be administered less efficiently (cf. Schröder / Würdemann 2008:
326 f.; Müller 2014: 81 f.).
Based on such pragmatic views,many jurisdictions around the globe have recently
takenmeasures to facilitate the production of legislative texts that are easier to under-
stand and more transparent. Some countries have gone as far as to enact legal pro-
visions stating that official documents such as statutes and regulations must be draft-
ed in clear and transparent language. Examples of such provisions can be found, for
instance, in the United States Plain Writing Act of 2010 (Publ.L. 111–274) and in
Article 7 of the Swiss Languages Act of 5 October 2007 (SR 441.1). In common-
law jurisdictions, the goal of plain-language drafting has often become a constituent
part of the eduction of professional legislative drafters (cf. Xanthaki 2015; Uhlmann /
Höfler 2016). In contrast, many civil-law countries, who do not usually employ pro-
fessional drafters, have established specific institutions in their legislative process
tasked with ensuring that new statutes and regulations are drafted in clear and trans-
parent language. One example of such an institution is the Internal Drafting Commit-
tee of the Swiss Federal Administration (cf. Nussbaumer 2008; Höfler 2018). This
committee, composed of lawyers as well as language experts, examines the wording
of all drafts of statutes and regulations andmakes suggestions as to how they could be
formulated in a clearer and more transparent way. All administrative units in charge
of a legislative project are obliged to formally consult the committee early on and
repeatedly during the drafting process and to consider and discuss the suggestions
the committee makes. Similar institutions can be found, for instance, in Germany
(cf. Thieme / Raff 2017) or Sweden (cf. Ehrenberg-Sundin 2008).
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Nonetheless, transparency continues to pose practical problems for those who are
tasked with the composition of statutes and regulations. One of the reasons for this
state of affairs is that suggestions as to how the clarity of legislative texts can be im-
proved often content themselves with addressing issues of terminology and sentence
complexity. In doing so, they neglect some crucial findings of linguistic research on
text comprehension. Such research has shown that while the use of familiar words
and straight-forward sentences certainly facilitates the comprehensibility of a text,
it is even more important that the text enables its readers to construct a coherent
model of its content: textual coherence (i. e. the semantic and pragmatic relations
that hold between the segments of a text) and textual cohesion (i. e. the use of lexical
items and syntactic constructions to express these relations) play a vital role in what
makes a text understandable (cf. van Dijk / Kintsch 1983; Schnotz 2000; Christmann
2008).
An explanation of why legislative drafting guidelines frequently neglect this as-
pect of text composition can be found in the manner in which lawyers typically ap-
proach and apply legislative texts: statutes and ordinances are rarely read from be-
ginning to end, lawyers rather pick out the paragraphs and sentences relevant to the
case at hand (cf. Nussbaumer 1995: 96). As a consequence, legislative drafting guide-
lines tend to advocate a certain degree of de-contextualisation, stating that the indi-
vidual provisions of a legislative text should, wherever possible, stand on their own,
i. e. that they should be understandable and citablewith as little recourse to context as
possible. In many respects, one can thus identify two different perspectives on what
legislative texts are: (a) relatively loose collections of individual provisions that can
be understoodwithout recourse to context, or (b) coherent textsmade up of normative
statements that exhibit rich pragmatic and semantic interconnections (Werlen 1994:
76). If the practice of legislative drafting is to take into account the findings of lin-
guistic research on text comprehension, it will have to unify these two perspectives.
In the remainder of this chapter, I will illustrate how text linguistics can contribute to
achieving this goal.
III. Text linguistics at work
Text linguistics is a comparatively new linguistic sub-discipline concerned with
investigating the linguistic properties of texts as a means of communication: it asks
what texts are (i. e. how the notion of “textuality” can be defined),what genres of texts
there are, what functions they serve and what structures they exhibit (cf. de Beau-
grande / Dressler 1981; Brinker et al. 2000; Adamzik 2016; Hausendorf et al.
2017). On the one hand, text linguistics studies the genre-specific features of texts
and the way in which these features interact with the specific communicative and in-
stitutional environments in which the respective texts are used. On the other hand,
text linguistics is interested in the general cognitive mechanisms underlying textual
communication at large (cf. de Beaugrande / Dressler 1981: 210).
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One of the core findings of text linguistics is that text comprehension, i. e. the con-
struction of a coherent mental model of the meanings conveyed by a text, comprises
the processing of multiple layers of textual structure (cf. Brown / Yule 1983; Motsch
1996; Stede 2007). In order to understand what a text says, readers will have to grasp,
among other things, the functional, thematic and propositional structures present in
that text. For a text to be transparent, readers must thus be enabled to recover these
three layers of text structure as easily as possible. In what follows, I will discuss what
this finding means for legislative drafting. I will illustrate my considerations with
examples from Swiss federal law and from the work of the aforementioned Internal
Drafting Committee of the Swiss Federal Administration.1
1. Functional structure
Modern-day text linguistics takes an avowedly pragmatic perspective on texts:
texts are considered instruments of communication employed to achieve a certain
effect in the world, i. e. they serve a specific function. This function is determined
by the genre to which a text belongs and the institutional context in which it is
used. This also applies to statutes and regulations. As a genre, legislative texts are
used to direct people’s behaviour, to organise communal life, to control the directions
in which society develops and to serve as a means of pacification and integration (cf.
Müller / Uhlmann 2013: 17–25). Certain sub-genres of legislative texts may also
serve functions defined by the intertextual setting inwhich legislative texts exist. Cer-
tain statutes, for instance, serve the specific purpose of incorporating legal rules set
up in an international context into the national corpus of law.Most regulations, on the
other hand, serve the function of further specifying the legal rules set up in a statute
(primary vs. secondary legislation).
Within such genre-specific institutional settings, individual legislative texts can
then be described as being aimed at regulating specific aspects of life and at bringing
about specific changes to society and its physical environment (e.g. protecting for-
ests from human exploitation or providing better care for the elderly). The individual
segments of a legislative text can in turn be interpreted as making specific contribu-
tions to the global function of the text, thus serving local functions of their own, such
as prohibiting certain actions, granting certain rights, delegating a certainmatter to be
dealt with by a subordinate legislative body or generally informing readers on the
contents of the text and on the date of its commencement. In text linguistics, this re-
cursive functionality of texts has sometimes been referred to as their “illocutionary
structure” (cf. Motsch 1996).
1 Swiss federal laws are drafted in equally authentic versions in German, French and Ita-
lian. Particularly important statutes and regulations are also translated into Romansh and
English. All examples in this chapter are presented in the German original and translated into
English. If available, I have used the official translation provided by the Swiss Federal
Chancellery; in all other cases, the translation is my own.
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Legislative drafters face the task of making the functions fulfilled by the text as a
whole as well as by its individual segments transparent. Several genre-specificmeans
are available to them to achieve this goal. However, thesemeans need to be employed
carefully and with respect to the general principles of text comprehension in order to
properly serve their purpose. In what follows, I will briefly discuss three elements
that can foster or obstruct the transparency of the functional structure of legislative
texts depending on how they are realised: (a) statements of purpose, (b) modality and
(c) definitions of terms.
a) Statements of purpose
The global functions of legislative texts generally become apparent from their title
and from specific provisions inserted at the beginning of a text which state the aim the
legislator pursues with the text. The titles of legislative texts usually do not just name
the topic of the text but also indicate the genre and sub-genre to which the respective
text belongs. They thus provide some first information on the general function of the
text, as can be seen in the following title typical for Swiss federal legislation, which
includes both the sub-genre (“Federal Act”) and the subject matter regulated in the
text (“Film Production and Film Culture”):2
Bundesgesetz über Filmproduktion und
Filmkultur
Federal Act on Film Production and Film
Culture
Sometimes, the title also indicates the aim that the legislator pursues with the
respective piece of legislation. If, as in the above example, the aim pursued by
the legislator does not become evident from the title of the text, it may be made
transparent by an explicit statement of purpose. Depending on the drafting tradition
to which the text belongs, such a statement may be realised as a preamble to the text
or as a part of the text itself. The aforementioned Federal Act on Film Production
and FilmCulture, for instance, includes as its first article the following statement of
purpose:
Art. 1 Zweck
Dieses Gesetz soll die Vielfalt und Qualität des
Filmangebots sowie das Filmschaffen fördern
und die Filmkultur stärken.
Art. 1 Aim
This Act is intended to promote the diversity
and quality of the films on offer and the crea-
tion of films and to strengthen film culture.
However, a statement of purpose can only fulfil its role if it really does name the
aim of the respective piece of legislation and not merely state the subject matter of
the text. The latter is the case, for instance, in the following provision from the Or-
dinance of the Minimal Requirements for the Premises of Gun Shops:3
2 Bundesgesetz vom 14. Dezember 2001 über Filmproduktion und Filmkultur (SR 443.1).
3 Verordnung vom 21. September 1989 über die Mindestanforderungen für Geschäfts-
räume von Waffenhandlungen (SR 514.544.2).
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Art. 1 Zweck
Diese Verordnung legt die Mindest-
anforderungen an die Geschäftsräume fest,
über die ein Inhaber oder eine Inhaberin einer
Waffenhandelsbewilligung verfügen muss.
Art. 1 Aim
This Ordinance determines the minimal re-
quirements for the business premises that the
holder of an arms trade licence must possess.
This provision does not contribute to the transparency of the text as, given the title
of the ordinance, it merely states the obvious. The aim pursued by the legislator only
becomes clear to readers once they inspect the remainder of the text: the ordinance is
obviously intended to prevent weapons from falling into the wrong hands. The ex-
ample illustrates that drafting instruments must be employed carefully and according
to their true purpose if they are to have any effect on the clarity of a text.
b) Modality
The function of legislative texts materialises most immediately in the individual
provisions they contain. Traditionally, the normative function of these provisions has
been made transparent by the use of modal verbs such as the English shall (cf. Wil-
liams 2006). In contrast, many modern drafting guidelines suggest that this function
can be safely inferred from the text genre and thus needs not be made explicit: “Leg-
islation is compulsory, it introduces commands that must be complied with anyway.
The use of ‘shall’ […] is therefore superfluous. […] Where there is no discretion, a
duty is introduced by the present tense or ‘must’” (Xantaki 2014: 124, 151). It re-
mains to be asked under what circumstances the present tense is to be used and
when the modal verb must.
For one, the use ofmust canmake it transparent that the state places a duty to act on
a third person rather than committing himself to such action. This drafting technique
has been applied, for instance, in Article 6 of the Swiss Ordinance on Viticulture and
the Import of Wine4 (emphasis added):
Art. 6 Widerrechtlich gepflanzte Reben Art. 6 Illegally planted vines
1 Der Kanton verfügt die Beseitigung wider-
rechtlich angepflanzter Reben.
1 The Canton orders the removal of illegally
planted vines.
2 Die Bewirtschafterin bzw. der Bewirtschafter
oder die Grundeigentümerin bzw. der Grund-
eigentümer muss die Reben innerhalb von
zwölf Monaten nach Erhalt der kantonalen
Verfügung beseitigen. Nach unbenutztem
Ablauf dieser Frist beseitigt der Kanton die
Reben auf Kosten des Fehlbaren.
2 The manager or owner of the land must re-
move the vines within twelve months after
having received the cantonal order. After the
deadline has elapsed unused, the Canton re-
moves the vines at the expense of the culpable
person.
4 Verordnung vom 14. November 2007 über den Rebbau und die Einfuhr von Wein
(SR 916.140).
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In this example, the use of must marks a shift of perspective. In paragraph 1, the
state commits itself to ordering the removal of illegally planted vines: the Canton is
given the right and duty to do so. In contrast, the first sentence of paragraph 2 obliges
a private individual (the manager or owner of the land) to remove the vines within a
certain amount of time. As the state can neither foresee nor guarantee that said person
will do as ordered, the use of must rather than plain indicative seems appropriate for
this provision. The second sentence of paragraph 2 then shifts the perspective back to
the state, committing it to removing the vines if the manager or owner of the land has
not done so in time. The alternation between the indicative and must thus makes it
transparent what types of speech act the individual provisions represent: paragraph 1
and the second sentence of paragraph 2 constitute commissives and the first sentence
of paragraph 2 a directive speech act (cf. Searle 1979).
The use of the modal verb must may also serve to disambiguate between obliga-
tions on the one hand and legal definitions, legal assumptions and legal fictions on the
other hand. This phenomenon can be observed, for instance, in Article 5 paragraph 2
of the Swiss Federal Constitution5 (emphasis added):
Staatliches Handeln muss im öffentlichen In-
teresse liegen und verhältnismässig sein.
State activitiesmust be conducted in the public
interest and be proportionate to the ends
sought.
Even though this provision represents a commitment of the state to adhere to cer-
tain principles and would thus normally be formulated in the indicative, it is phrased
with the modal verbmust. The motivation for this deviation from custom can be sur-
mised once the modal verb is omitted from the sentence:
Staatliches Handeln liegt im öffentlichen In-
teresse und ist verhältnismässig.
State activities are conducted in the public
interest and are proportionate to the ends
sought.
This version of the provision does not make it sufficiently clear whether state ac-
tivities must be conducted in the public interest etc. (obligation) or whether state ac-
tivities are to be considered, by definition, as conducted in the public interest etc.
(legal fiction). In this example, the modal verb must has thus apparently been
used to make it transparent which of the two possible speech acts the provision rep-
resents. Both examples therefore demonstrate that, while it may not always be nec-
essary to make the modality of provisions explicit, the use of the modal verb must
may, at times, improve the transparency of a legislative text: it can disambiguate be-
tween speech acts and thus increase the chances that a certain provision will be in-
terpreted as intended.
5 Bundesverfassung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft vom 18. April 1999 (SR 101).
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c) Definitions of terms
The illocutionary structure of a legislative text may also be obscured if material
provisions are hidden in definitions of terms. This was the case, e. g., in the following
provision from an early draft of theOrdinance of the Swiss Federal Department of the
Interior on the Promotion of Films6 (emphasis added):
Art. 2 Begriffe Art. 2 Terms
In dieser Verordnung bedeutet: In this Ordinance:
a. “Projektbeitrag”: eine Finanzhilfe an
die Kosten für ein einmaliges, zeitlich und
örtlich begrenztes Vorhaben;
a. “project contribution” means a financial
aid towards the costs of a single, localised
and temporary undertaking;
b. “Strukturbeitrag”: eine Finanzhilfe an
die laufenden Betriebskosten eines Unter-
nehmens, das regelmässig öffentliche Auf-
gaben erfüllt.
b. “structural contribution” means a finan-
cial aid towards the on-going operating costs
of a company that regularly exercises pub-
lic functions.
While this provision serves two purposes, only one of them is transparent from
outset: to delineate the meanings of the terms “project contribution” and “structural
contribution”. However, the provision does more than that: by specifying, under
letter b, that a structural contribution is not just a financial aid towards the on-
going operating costs of any company but specifically to a company “that regularly
exercises public functions”, it also stipulates who is eligible for this type of contri-
butions in the first place. In a later draft, this hidden material provision was made
transparent in a statement of its own:
Art. 2 Begriffe Art. 2 Terms
In dieser Verordnung bedeutet: In this Ordinance:
a. “Projektbeitrag”: eine Finanzhilfe an
die Kosten für ein einmaliges, zeitlich und
örtlich begrenztes Vorhaben;
a. “project contribution” means a financial
aid towards the costs of a single, localized
and temporary undertaking;
b. “Strukturbeitrag”: eine Finanzhilfe an
die laufenden Betriebskosten eines Unter-
nehmens.
b. “structural contribution” means a finan-
cial aid towards the on-going operating costs
of a company.
Art. 17 Förderbare Unternehmen Art. 17 Eligible companies
Strukturbeiträge können nur vonUnternehmen
beantragt werden, die regelmässig Aufgaben
im öffentlichen Interesse erfüllen.
Structural contributions may only be applied
for by companies that regularly exercise public
functions.
Textual transparency can thus also be facilitated by not conflatingmultiple speech
acts into a single provision, especially if these speech acts represent different types of
norms (e. g. legal definitions vs. material requirements). Readers are thenmore likely
to find the information they are looking for. In the example discussed above, readers
will find it easier to recover information on who is eligible to apply for a certain type
6 Verordnung des EDI vom 21. April 2016 über die Filmförderung (SR 443.113).
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of financial aid if those requirements are stated explicitly rather than hidden in a def-
inition of terms.
2. Thematic structure
A second layer of textual structure derives from the fact that texts are usually
meant to provide their readers with information on some topic (cf. Lötscher
1987). However, the problem that anyone composing a text faces is that, while topics
are multidimensional semantic entities, texts are mostly two-dimensional. The over-
all topic of a text will thus have to be further developed (or rather “unfolded”): it will
have to be broken down into sub-topics and sub-sub-topics (segmentation), and these
sub-topics and sub-sub-topics will have to be brought into a sequential order (line-
arisation). The result of this process is what text linguistics refers to as the thematic
structure of a text (cf. Brinker 2010: 40–56). It covers both the large-scale ordering
of contents at the level of chapters and sections as well as the local ordering of con-
tents at the level of individual paragraphs and sentences.
Studies have shown that the comprehensibility of a text can be fostered (a) by ar-
ranging its contents in a sequential order that supports readers in building a coherent
mental model of these contents and (b) by making the order by which the contents
have been arranged transparent at the surface level of the text (cf. Christmann 2008:
198 f.; Lorch 1989). In what follows, I will give some examples of how this dual in-
sight can be applied in legislative drafting.
a) Linearisation
The order in which the contents of a text are linearised can have an impact on how
easy it is for readers to find relevant information and to construct a coherent mental
model of what the text says. To find an optimal sequential order, drafters need to con-
sider both the potential expectations of the primary addressees as well as the general
cognitive principles of human information processing. With regard to the latter, one
approach to arranging the contents of a text has proven particularly beneficial: the-
matic continuity (cf. Schnotz 1994: 254 ff.; Christmann 2008: 1099). Contents that
naturally belong together should, whenever possible, not be broken up and distrib-
uted over different parts of a text but rather be presented in one piece. What this
maymean for legislative drafting can be illustrated by the Statutes of the Swiss Com-
petition Commission.7 A first draft of these statutes was organised into the following
chapters (in italics) and sections:
Zusammensetzung
Kommission
Kammern
Präsidium
Composition
Commission
Chambers
Presidium
7 Geschäftsreglement der Wettbewerbskommission vom 15. Juni 2015 (SR 251.1).
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Aufgaben
Kommission
Kammern
Präsidium
Functions
Commission
Chambers
Presidium
Sitzungen
Kommission
Kammern
Präsidium
Meetings
Commission
Chambers
Presidium
The draft exhibited a clear structure and the ordering principle it followed was
easy to recognise: it first defined how each of the three bodies of the Competition
Commission was to be composed, then described the functions that each body fulfils
and finally determined how the meetings of each body were to be organised. Never-
theless, the text proved difficult to read. From a cognitive perspective, this was hardly
surprising as the order in which the contents had been arranged tore apart what nat-
urally belonged together: instead of dealing with the individual bodies of the com-
mission one at a time, the contents were grouped according to abstract categories that
did not form natural units. Readers were forced to go back and forth between the in-
dividual bodies when consulting the text. In a later draft, this problem was resolved
by imposing thematic continuity and applying an organisational principle that re-
flected the nature of the objects described more directly (principle of iconicity):
Kommission
Zusammensetzung
Aufgaben
Sitzungen
Commission
Composition
Functions
Meetings
Kammern
Zusammensetzung
Aufgaben
Sitzungen
Chambers
Composition
Functions
Meetings
Präsidium
Zusammensetzung
Aufgaben
Sitzungen
Presidium
Composition
Functions
Meetings
Empirical studies have further shown that texts are easier to understand if they first
provide readers with a more general picture and only then move to the details (cf.
Christmann 1989). Such an incremental ordering of contents helps readers contex-
tualise the individual information they are given. The following article from an
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early draft of the Swiss Ordinance on Swiss Persons and Institutions Abroad8 may
serve to illustrate this point:
Art. 49 Subsidiarität Art. 49 Subsidiarity
1 Natürliche und juristische Personen haben
Massnahmen zu treffen, um Notlagen vorzu-
beugen, insbesondere indem sie die nationale
Gesetzgebung des Empfangsstaates und die
Empfehlungen des Bundes beachten und für
einen ausreichenden Versicherungsschutz
sorgen.
1 Individuals and legal entities must take steps
to avoid running into difficulty, in particular by
complying with the national legislation of the
receiving state and following the Confedera-
tion’s recommendations as well as ensuring
adequate insurance cover.
2 Die natürliche oder juristische Person muss
alle Handlungen vornehmen, die von ihr im
Sinne der Eigenverantwortung zu erwarten
sind, um eine Notlage selber organisatorisch
und finanziell zu überwinden. Die im Emp-
fangsstaat zur Verfügung stehenden Hilfeleis-
tungen sind soweit zumutbar in Anspruch zu
nehmen.
2 Before requesting assistance, individuals and
legal entities must do everything that may be
expected of them in terms of personal re-
sponsibility to overcome their difficulties from
an organisational and financial point of view
on their own. Where reasonable, use should be
made of any assistance available in the re-
ceiving state.
3 Schweizer Staatsangehörige können ihre
Auslandaufenthalte registrieren. Das EDA
stellt die elektronische Datenbank zur Verfü-
gung.
3 Swiss nationals may register their stays
abroad. The FDFA provides an electronic da-
tabase for this purpose.
4 Die Schutztätigkeit des Bundes kommt erst
dann zum Tragen, wenn eine natürliche oder
eine juristische Person aus eigener Kraft oder
mithilfe von Dritten die Mittel zur Selbsthilfe
ausgeschöpft hat.
4 The Confederation shall only provide pro-
tection after individuals or legal entities have
exhausted every means of helping themselves,
either on their own or with the help of third
parties.
In this article, specific duties and general principles follow each other in seeming-
ly random order. The general principle that the article deals with, i. e. the subsidiary
nature of the protection that the Swiss Confederation provides to its citizens abroad,
is only stated in the last paragraph of the article. However, since all other provisions in
the article constitute instantiations of this general principle and will thus have to be
interpreted in light of this principle, the article was later re-arranged as follows:
Art. 49 Subsidiarität Art. 49 Subsidiarity
1 Die Schutztätigkeit des Bundes kommt erst
dann zum Tragen, wenn eine natürliche oder
eine juristische Person aus eigener Kraft oder
mithilfe von Dritten die Mittel zur Selbsthilfe
ausgeschöpft hat.
1 The Confederation shall only provide pro-
tection after individuals or legal entities have
exhausted every means of helping themselves,
either on their own or with the help of third
parties.
2 Die natürliche oder juristische Person muss
zuvor alle Handlungen vornehmen, die von ihr
im Sinne der Eigenverantwortung zu erwarten
2 Before requesting assistance, individuals and
legal entities must do everything that may be
expected of them in terms of personal re-
8 Verordnung vom 7. Oktober 2015 über Schweizer Personen und Institutionen im Ausland
(SR 195.11).
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sind, um eine Notlage selber organisatorisch
und finanziell zu überwinden. Die im Emp-
fangsstaat zur Verfügung stehenden Hilfeleis-
tungen sind soweit zumutbar in Anspruch zu
nehmen.
sponsibility to overcome their difficulties from
an organisational and financial point of view
on their own. Where reasonable, use should be
made of any assistance available in the re-
ceiving state.
3 Natürliche und juristische Personen haben
Massnahmen zu treffen, um Notlagen vorzu-
beugen, insbesondere indem sie die nationale
Gesetzgebung des Empfangsstaates und die
Empfehlungen des Bundes beachten und für
einen ausreichenden Versicherungsschutz
sorgen.
3 Individuals and legal entities must take steps
to avoid running into difficulty, in particular by
complying with the national legislation of the
receiving state and following the Confedera-
tion’s recommendations as well as ensuring
adequate insurance cover.
4 Schweizer Staatsangehörige können ihre
Auslandaufenthalte registrieren. Das EDA
stellt die elektronische Datenbank zur Verfü-
gung.
4 Swiss nationals may register their stays
abroad. The FDFA provides an electronic da-
tabase for this purpose.
In its re-arranged version, the article moves from the general principle to ever
more specific requirements. Thismakes it easier for readers to recognise the rationale
underlying the individual provisions and to contextualise the information provided.
The overall topic of the article thus becomes more transparent.
b) Signposting
Even the best organisational principle can be in vain if the readers of the text are
not able to recognise it. It is thus crucial that drafters indicate the thematic organi-
sation of statutes and regulations on the surface level of the text. The textual conven-
tions of legislative drafting equips themwith several instruments to provide signposts
for the readers (cf. Hamann 2015).
One option is to provide a content statement and thus give readers a first overview
of the main topics covered by a legislative text. Depending on drafting conventions,
content statements may precede the actual text (e. g. the so-called “long title” in UK
acts; cf. Xanthaki 2014: 139 f.) or constitute the first “provision” of a statute or reg-
ulation. A content statement of the latter kind can be found, for instance, at the be-
ginning of the Swiss Federal Act on Foreign Nationals:9
Art. 1 Gegenstand Art. 1 Subject matter
Dieses Gesetz regelt die Ein- und Ausreise,
den Aufenthalt sowie den Familiennachzug
von Ausländerinnen und Ausländern in der
Schweiz. Zudem regelt es die Förderung von
deren Integration.
This Act regulates the entry and exit, residence
and family reunification of foreign nationals in
Switzerland. In addition, it regulates encour-
aging their integration.
9 Bundesgesetz vom 16. Dezember 2005 über die Ausländerinnen und Ausländer
(SR 142.20).
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While content statements may not constitute proper legal norms, they can still be
useful as so-called “advance organisers”: readers are introduced to the main contents
and the overall structure of the text. Thus, they are later better able to conceptualise
the information they encounter as they already know what to expect (cf. Ausubel
1960; Schnotz 1994: 280–282; Christmann 2000: 120).
However, the most conspicuous type of signposts legislative drafters can employ
are chapter and section headings. Headings best serve their function if they make
transparent what the respective text segment is about and how it relates to the
other segments of the text. This was not the case, for instance, for the following head-
ings in an early draft of the Swiss Ordinance on the Import, Transit and Export of
Animals and Animal Products from and to Third Countries:10
2. Abschnitt: Kontrollen bei der Ein- und
Durchfuhr
Art. 36 Umfang der grenztierärztlichen
Kontrollen bei der Einfuhr
Die grenztierärztliche Kontrolle umfasst für
jede Sendung: …
Section 2: Controls in the cases of import
and transit
Art. 36 Extent of border veterinary controls
in the case of import
Border veterinary controls comprise for each
shipment: …
Art. 37 Durchfuhrsendungen
Die grenztierärztliche Kontrolle umfasst für
jede Sendung: …
Art. 37 Transit shipments
Border veterinary controls comprise for each
shipment: …
The wording of these headings obscured the thematic structure of the text in sev-
eral ways. First, the section heading provided redundant information. According to
the communicative principle of relevance as described, invarious forms, by linguistic
pragmatics (cf. Grice 1975; Sperber / Wilson 1996), the fact that the restrictive at-
tribute in the cases of import and transit was added to the section heading suggested
that therewere controls other than those covered by the current section; however, this
was not the case. The attributewas therefore not only superfluous but potentiallymis-
leading. On the other hand, the section heading omitted information that was crucial
to understanding the subject matter of the section: The section did not define border
veterinary controls in general but only the extent of these controls – as indicated by
the heading of Article 36 (extent of …) and the use the verb comprise in the two pro-
visions. Third, the variation found in the wording of the two article headings ob-
scured the fact that they contained parallel provisions, with Article 36 applying to
import and Article 37 to transit. Finally, the provisions themselves were phrased
in a way that made it impossible for readers to know what they applied to without
taking the article heading into account. As a general rule, though, readers should
be able to derive the content of a provision from the actual text; headings should
10 Verordnung vom 18. November 2015 über die Ein-, Durch- und Ausfuhr von Tieren und
Tierprodukten im Verkehr mit Drittstaaten (SR 916.443.10); the example has been slightly
simplified.
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merely serve as signposts and not constitute a part of the provision itself. For these
reasons, headings and text were later re-cast as follows:
2. Abschnitt: Umfang der Kontrollen
Art. 36 Einfuhr
Bei der Einfuhr umfasst die grenztierärztliche
Kontrolle für jede Sendung: …
Section 2: Extent of the controls
Art. 36 Import
In the case of import, border veterinary con-
trols comprise for each shipment: …
Art. 37 Durchfuhr
Bei der Durchfuhr umfasst die grenztierärzt-
liche Kontrolle für jede Sendung: …
Art. 37 Transit
In the case of transit, border veterinary controls
comprise for each shipment: …
In this form, the headings now indicate much more succinctly the topics of the
respective text segments and the way these topics are related to each other. The the-
matic structure of the text thus becomes more transparent.
3. Propositional structure
A third layer of structure emerges from the propositional content of a text, i. e.
from the individual statements the text makes and the way these statements are log-
ically connected to each other. In order to comprehend the propositional structure of a
text, readers must be able to recognise what real-world entities it refers to and what
logical relations it establishes between them (cf. Brinker 2010: 22–40). Many legal
provisions express a conditional relation of some kind, i. e. they link some conditions
(e. g. certain situations, objects or people) to some legal consequences (e. g. certain
rights or duties).Moreover,most legal provisions are related to other provisions in the
text (e. g. they constitute exceptions or concretisations to a more general provision or
pose additional constraints on a process already introduced at an earlier point). Thus,
for readers to understand the propositional content of a legislative text, it is essential
that they recognise not only the internal structure of the individual provisions listed in
that text but also the way that these provisions are connected to each other. In sum,
legislative drafters face the dual challenge of making it transparent (a) what logical
relations hold both within and between the individual provisions of a statute or reg-
ulation and (b) what entities these provisions refer to.
a) Relations
Experience shows that in order to make the relations holding within and between
legal provisions transparent, it is advisable to aim for iconicity, i. e. the surface struc-
ture of the text is to reflect the structure of its content as directly as possible (cf.
Lötscher 2008). First and foremost, this means that the wording of individual provi-
sions should clearly distinguish between condition and consequence and accurately
describe the logical relation holding between them. This was not the case, for exam-
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ple, in the following provision from a draft of the Swiss Federal Act on Explosive
Materials:11
Vorgesetzte von Betrieben oder Unternehmen,
in denen sich beimUmgang mit Sprengmitteln
oder pyrotechnischen Gegenständen eine Ex-
plosion mit Personen oder erheblichem Sach-
schaden ereignet, haben unverzüglich die Po-
lizei zu informieren.
Supervisors of companies or enterprises in
which the handling of explosives or pyro-
technical articles leads to an explosion that
causes personal or severe material damage
must immediately notify the police.
The wording of this provision does not accurately represent the conditional struc-
ture of the legal norm that it is meant to convey, namely that if in a company or enter-
prise the handling of explosives or pyrotechnical articles leads to an explosion that
causes personal or severe material damage, the supervisors must immediately notify
the police. The use of a noun phrase modified by a relative clause rather suggests that
the provision applies to a certain class of supervisors (“supervisors of companies or
enterprises in which the handling of explosives or pyrotechnical articles leads to an
explosion that causes personal or severematerial damage”) and that these supervisors
have a specific duty (“must immediately notify the police”). However, in the condi-
tional relation that the provision ismeant to describe, the supervisors do not form part
of the condition but only appear in the legal consequence. In a later version of the text,
the provision was re-phrased in a more iconic manner, thus making the logical struc-
ture of the underlying norm transparent:
Ereignet sich in Betrieben oder in Unterneh-
men beim Umgang mit Sprengmitteln oder
pyrotechnischen Gegenständen eine Explo-
sion mit Personen- oder erheblichem Sach-
schaden, so haben die Vorgesetzten unverzü-
glich die Polizei zu informieren.
If in a company or enterprise the handling of
explosives or pyrotechnical articles leads to an
explosion that causes personal or severe ma-
terial damage, the supervisors must immedi-
ately notify the police.
The principle of iconicity can also be applied to the structuring of paragraphs and
articles. This can be illustrated with the following article from the Federal Supreme
Court Act:12
Art. 10 Unvereinbarkeit Art. 10 Incompatibility
1 Die Richter und Richterinnen dürfen weder
der Bundesversammlung noch dem Bundesrat
angehören und in keinem anderen Arbeits-
verhältnis mit dem Bund stehen.
1 The judges of the Court may not be members
of the Federal Assembly, the Federal Council
or otherwise be employed by the Confedera-
tion.
2 Sie dürfen weder eine Tätigkeit ausüben,
welche die Erfüllung der Amtspflichten, die
Unabhängigkeit oder das Ansehen des Ger-
2 They may not engage in any activity that
impairs their ability to fulfil the duties of their
office or is injurious to the independence or the
11 Bundesgesetz vom 25. März 1977 über explosionsgefährliche Stoffe (SR 941.41).
12 Bundesgesetz vom 17. Juni 2005 über das Bundesgericht (SR 173.110).
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ichts beeinträchtigt, noch berufsmässig Dritte
vor dem Bundesgericht vertreten.
reputation of the Court nor professionally
represent third parties at the Court.
3 Sie dürfen keine amtliche Funktion für einen
ausländischen Staat ausüben und keine Titel
oder Orden ausländischer Behörden anneh-
men.
3 Theymay not serve in any official capacity on
behalf of a foreign state and not accept any
titles or orders from foreign authorities.
4 Die ordentlichen Richter und Richterinnen
dürfen kein Amt eines Kantons bekleiden und
keine andere Erwerbstätigkeit ausüben. Sie
dürfen auch nicht als Mitglied der Geschäfts-
leitung, der Verwaltung, der Aufsichtsstelle
oder der Revisionsstelle eines wirtschaftlichen
Unternehmens tätig sein.
4 The permanent judges may not hold office in
a canton or engage in any other gainful activity.
They may not be members of the management
board, board of directors, advisory board or
serve as auditors of a commercial enterprise.
The surface structure of this article does not reflect the semantic structure of the
provisions it contains. While the surface structure falls into four paragraphs, the un-
derlying propositional structure consists of only two elements: a general rule detail-
ing the activities that are incompatible with the office of any kind of judge and a spe-
cial rule detailing the activities that are additionally incompatible with the office of a
permanent judge. The general rule is spread out over the first three paragraphs of the
article, the special rule is contained in the fourth paragraph. A more iconic represen-
tation of the two rules could have looked as follows:
Art. 10 Unvereinbarkeit Art. 10 Incompatibility
1 Die Richter und Richterinnen dürfen nicht: 1 The judges of the Court may not:
a. der Bundesversammlung noch dem
Bundesrat angehören oder in keinem
anderen Arbeitsverhältnis mit dem Bund
stehen;
a. be members of the Federal Assembly,
the Federal Council or otherwise be em-
ployed by the Confederation;
b. eine Tätigkeit ausüben, welche die Erfül-
lung der Amtspflichten, die Unabhängigkeit
oder dasAnsehen desGerichts beeinträchtigt,
oder berufsmässig Dritte vor dem Bundesge-
richt vertreten;
b. engage in any activity that impairs
their ability to fulfil the duties of the office
or is injurious to the independence or the
reputation of the Court or profession-
ally represent third parties at the Court;
c. eine amtliche Funktion für einen aus-
ländischen Staat ausüben oder Titel oder Or-
den ausländischer Behörden annehmen.
c. serve in any official capacity on behalf
of a foreign state or accept any titles or orders
from foreign authorities.
2 Die ordentlichen Richter und Richterinnen
dürfen zudem nicht:
2 The permanent judges may also not:
a. ein Amt eines Kantons bekleiden oder
eine andere Erwerbstätigkeit ausüben;
a. hold office in a canton or engage in any
other gainful activity;
b. als Mitglied der Geschäftsleitung, der
Verwaltung, der Aufsichtsstelle oder der
Revisionsstelle eines wirtschaftlichen
Unternehmens tätig sein.
b. be members of the management board,
board of directors, advisory board or serve
as auditors of a commercial enterprise.
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In this version of the article, the propositional structure is more transparent: the
two paragraphs at the surface level reflect the two-part nature of the underlying norm,
and the adverb also in the second paragraph makes it clear that the second provision
applies in addition rather than instead of the first.
b) Reference
The propositional structure of a text may also be difficult to grasp if it is not clear
what entities the individual propositions refer to. One linguistic phenomenon that fre-
quently obstructs the process of reference resolution are bridging references. A bridg-
ing reference is an anaphoric expression that does not refer to its antecedent explicitly
(e. g. a house … the house/it) but rather alludes to it implicitly (e. g. a house … the
chimney). In order to resolve a bridging reference, readers need to have specific world
knowledge at their disposal (e.g. that houses have chimneys). If the resolution of a
bridging reference requires too much knowledge or too much cognitive effort on the
part of the readers, it can hinder the process of text understanding. The following ex-
cerpt from the draft of a partial revision of the Swiss Federal Electricity Act13 con-
tained such a counter-productive bridging reference (emphasis added):
Art. 18 Art. 18
Das Bundesamt für Energie kann Projektier-
ungszonen festlegen, um Grundstücke für
künftige Starkstromanlagen freizuhalten.
The Federal Office of Energy may define de-
velopment zones in order to keep properties
clear for future power installations.
Art. 20 Art. 20
Kommen Eigentumsbeschränkungen nach
Artikel 18 einer Enteignung gleich, so sind sie
voll zu entschädigen.
If ownership restrictions according to
Article 18 are equivalent to expropriation, full
compensation has to be made.
The provision in Article 20 refers to some “ownership restrictions” supposedly
introduced in Article 18. However, Article 18 does not explicitly mention any “own-
ership restrictions”. Readers will only be able to resolve this reference if they realise
that the definition of development zones described in Article 18 can result in an own-
ership restriction, as land owners would, for instance, not be able to use their land to
build a house anymore. The resolution of the reference thus requires considerable
knowledge and cognitive effort. The situation was remedied in a later draft by replac-
ing the bridging reference in Article 20 with an explicit reference to the notion of
defining development zones and to the fact that it can result in an ownership restric-
tion (emphasis added):
13 Elektrizitätsgesetz vom 24. Juni 1902 (SR 734.0).
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Art. 18 Art. 18
Das Bundesamt für Energie kann Projektier-
ungszonen festlegen, um Grundstücke für
künftige Starkstromanlagen freizuhalten.
The Federal Office of Energy may define de-
velopment zones in order to keep properties
clear for future power installations.
Art. 20 Art. 20
Führt die Festlegung einer Projektierungszone
zu einer Eigentumsbeschränkung, die einer
Enteignung gleichkommt, so ist diese voll zu
entschädigen.
If the definition of a development zone results
in an ownership restriction equivalent to ex-
propriation, full compensation has to be made.
The propositional structure of a legislative text is also obscured if thewording of a
provision wrongly creates the impression that it refers to an entity that has been in-
troduced into the discourse elsewhere, while it actually merely presupposes that en-
tity’s existence. An example of such a presupposition could be found in the draft of a
bill to change the Swiss Railway Act14 (emphasis added):
Die Weiterentwicklung der Bahninfrastruktur
erfolgt im Rahmen des Entwicklungsprog-
rammes des Bundes und gema¨ss den folgenden
Zielen: …
The railway infrastructure is further developed
within the framework of the development
programme of the Confederation and accord-
ing to the following goals: …
The use of the definite article the with the noun phrase federal development pro-
gramme implies that said programmes are already known to the reader, either because
they have already been mentioned or because they constitute common knowledge. In
reality, neither was the case. Effectively, the use of a definite noun phrase thus intro-
duced an implicit norm, providing that the Confederation is obliged to have a federal
development programme. In a later version of the draft, this obligation was made
transparent by inserting an explicit provision for the content that was merely presup-
posed in the previous draft (emphasis added):
1 Die Weiterentwicklung der Bahninfrastruk-
tur hat folgende Ziele: …
1 The railway infrastructure is further devel-
oped according to the following goals: …
2 Der Bundesrat unterbreitet der Bundesver-
sammlung in regelma¨ssigen Absta¨nden Pro-
gramme zur Weiterentwicklung der Bahn-
infrastruktur (Entwicklungsprogramme).
2 The Federal Council periodically submits
programmes for the further development of the
railway infrastructure (development pro-
grammes) to the Federal Assembly.
3 In den Entwicklungsprogrammen zeigt er
auf, wie er die Ziele erreichen will.
3 In the development programmes, the Federal
Council outlines how it intends to accomplish
the goals.
Presuppositions do not only constitute an impediment to text understanding but
may also infringe on the constitutional principle of legality. This principle states,
among other things, that the law must be specific enough for those who are subject
14 Eisenbahngesetz vom 20. Dezember 1957 (SR 742.101).
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to it to be able to recognise what they may or may not do. Presuppositions will thus
not always provide sufficient legal grounds for a norm to be enforced (cf. Höfler
2014, 2017).
IV. Transparent drafting in a globalised world
An increasingly globalised world poses both a threat and a challenge for the goal
of transparency in legislative drafting. Intertextual connections between different
pieces of legislation more and more transcend the borders of national law. But if na-
tional law will increasingly have to be interpreted in the context of international trea-
ties, then national legislators lose significant influence over how transparent their law
will be. In this context, it would be all too easy to give up on the goal of transparency
altogether. Indeed, an argument one occasionally hears is that if the nation state has to
incorporate a piece of supranational legislation that has been drafted in non-transpar-
ent language, then it is easier to simply copy this piece of legislation rather than to
come up with one’s own alternativewording. The resulting national lawmight not be
transparent but at least it would presumably also not deviate from the (obscured) in-
tentions of the supranational legislator.15 This argument is, of course, doubly flawed.
First, any transplanting of a piece of text from one context into another will automati-
cally effect its meaning: legislative statements can never be interpreted in isolation
butmust always be readwith regard to the context in which they appear. Second, even
if this workaround did guarantee textual equivalence, it would lead to the prolifera-
tion of non-transparent language and thus jeopardise the quality of legislation at
large. To prevent such dynamics, it is thus important that legislators make plain-lan-
guage drafting a priority.
However, this goal can only be achieved if we know what it takes for a legislative
text to be transparent in the first place: it is vital that both the legal and the language
sciences work together and develop concepts and methods to help drafters fulfil their
task. Scientific studies of legislative drafting are still comparatively sparse. Law
scholars as well as linguists still mostly focus on questions related to the interpreta-
tion of the law and thereby neglect the perspective of composition. Above, I have
shown how the insights of text linguistics can be applied to improve the clarity of
legislative texts. Text linguistics has the advantage that it combines insights into gen-
eral cognitive mechanisms of language understanding with a realisation that, as
means of communication, texts are heavily influenced by the conventions of their
genre and the institutional setting in which they are used. Its concepts and methods
are thus apt, maybemore so than those of other approaches to language, to be applied
in an interdisciplinary environment like the one at hand. In a globalised world, how-
15 For a discussion of the pros and cons of this practice see e. g. the Swiss Federal Admi-
nistration’s rules of thumbs for the implementation of EU law in national law (available online
at: www.bk.admin.ch > Dokumentation > Rechtsetzungsbegleitung > Übernahme von EU-
Recht: Formale Aspekte > Hilfsmittel > Faustregeln für die Umsetzung von EU-Recht in
Schweizerisches Recht).
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ever, such efforts will have to transcend the boundaries of national conventions and
languages. What is ultimately needed is a general theory of legislative drafting that
includes legal as well as linguistic aspects and that is capable of capturing the legal
and cognitive properties underlying all legislation, independent of the legal system
and language in which it has been drafted.
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